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My interest in this topic was piqued as I reread the oldest entrapment
case in literature, that of Oedipus Rex. The Oedipus cycle consists of three
plays, written at different parts of the poet's life. He probably wrote
Antigone first, then followed with King Oedipus more than a decade later,
then Oedipus at Colonus toward the end of his life.' In King Oedipus,
Sophocles shows us Oedipus's relationship with his mother, the killing
of his father, and his being cast out of civilized society. It is quite clear
that Oedipus did not know any of the facts that would have made his
conduct a violation of secular or god-made law. Yet he is punished.
In Oedipus at Colonus, we see the old king near the end of his life. He
meets Theseus, King of Athens, and rages about the injustice of punishing
people who do not know or appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.
Was I the sinner?
Repaying wrong for wrong-that was no sin,
Even were it wittingly done, as it was not.
I did not know the way I went. They knew;
They, who devised this trap for me, they knew!2
Why the change from one play to another? George Thomson, the em-
inent classical scholar, suggests an answer in his book Aeschylus and
Athens3 that I find persuasive: Greek philosophy, at the point somewhere
between the authorship of these two plays, began to explore the difference
between nature and norm, physis and nomos. Thomson ties the intro-
*Joseph D. Jamail Chair in Law, The University of Texas at Austin. J.D.,
Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
'SOPHOCLES, THE THEBAN PLAYS 12-13 (E. Watling trans. 1947).
2 Id. at 79.
3 G. THOMSON, AESCHYLUS & ATHENS (1941), discussed in M. TIGAR, LAW &
THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 278-79 (1977).
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duction of this distinction between norms we make up and the reality of
the world around us to the introduction of money as the abstraction of
commodities in the Greek economy.
4
Whether or not one agrees with Thomson, the shift in emphasis between
the plays is striking. Oedipus arraigns the system of punishment based
upon whether it takes account of the supposed ability to choose between
right and wrong courses of conduct. While there may be debate over the
ability of people to choose the right, Oedipus's argument is that the system
of justice must treat actors "as if' they could choose.5 A system that
punishes without providing such an opportunity simply gives over the
function of identifying targets of punishment to blind forces of fate or
chance, or worse yet, to malign vengeance-seekers.
The debate found in the pages of Sophocles has continued through the
centuries. Modern scholars and sages of the criminal law have sought to
clarify its terms in the Model Penal Code.6
While the Code does not answer all the interpretive questions one might
raise, its comforting symmetry makes the onlooker's life easier than the
patchwork of federal criminal offenses. In confronting the system of fed-
eral crimes, no word has sown more confusion than "willfully." While the
term appears in literally dozens of offenses in Titles 18 and 26 of the
United States Code 7, its meaning may vary considerably. Moreover, will-
fulness may be added to a statutory offense definition by judicial decision8
or to the indictments' allegations by prosecutorial practiceY However, the
absence of a unitary judicial and legislative definition of willfulness is
4 G. THOMSON, supra note 3, at 351-71.
5 See generally Edgar, Mens Rea, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1028-
40 (S. Kadish ed. 1983).
6 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01-2.13 (1985). However, the language of particular
offenses may bedevil courts in trying to identify which element should be modified
by a particular intent. See Alvarado v. State, 841 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 125 (1988). See also infra notes 78-115 and accompanying
discussion.
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 656, 657, 1001 (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6672, 7201, 7206 (1982); 26
U.S.C. § 7213 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
8 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), infra notes 54-59 and
accompanying text.
9 Indictments often contain the word "willfully" even though that term is not
in the definition of the statutory offense. If one concludes that the term is un-
necessary, the solution is not to strike it out. Amending an indictment, even to
delete arguable surplusage, is fraught with peril. Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 7(d) permits surplusage to be deleted only on motion of a defendant, and
the Advisory Committee Notes cite Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) for the
proposition that amending an indictment is forbidden without the accused's con-
sent. Amendment cases in the Fifth Circuit include United States v. Salinas, 601
F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1979).
One conclusion of this essay, however, is that pattern jury instructions should
not provide a single, separate definition of "willfully," but should separately define
the intent element of each offense. This view has been adopted in the draft of
revised pattern jury instructions for the Fifth Circuit, for which I served as
Reporter. See Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Fifth Circuit (Proposed
Official Draft 1990) (available in the University of Texas at Austin School of Law
Library).
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not a reason for throwing over well-established rules aboflt criminal in-
tent. Precision and differentiation, and not any single categorical imper-
ative, are the goals. All the slogans deployed in an effort to diminish the
role of intent in federal criminal law turn out, on examination, to be
seriously misleading.'
I. THE FAILURE OF ACADEMIC DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GENERAL
AND SPECIFIC INTENT
The old "hornbook" definition of intent distinguishes between the spe-
cific desire to accomplish an unlawful result (specific intent) and the
voluntary commission of the act constituting the crime (general intent).1
Beyond these standards lie the so-called "strict liability" offenses, such
10 A draft of revised pattern jury instructions for the Fifth Circuit, Id., sum-
marizes the confusion:
The word "willfully" is frequently included in the indictment, even
when not required by statute or case law. This practice should be
discouraged. The 1978 Fifth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions inserted "willfully" as an element of almost every crime and
then supplied this definition of that term:
"The word 'willfully,' as that term has been used from time to time
in these instructions, means that the act was committed voluntarily
and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids;
that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the
law."
Court decisions indicate, however, that this definition is not accu-
rate in every situation. As stated in United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d
922,924 (5th Cir. 1978), the term "willfully" has "defied any consistent
interpretation by the courts." In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
403 (1980), the Court stated that "[Flew areas of criminal law pose
more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for
any particular crime." For example, in prosecutions under the Internal
Revenue Code, "willfully" has generally been defined as "a voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty." United States v. Burton,
737 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1984). This definition is taken primarily
from United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976). The Supreme
Court has discussed the various meanings of the term "willfulness,"
as used in the criminal tax statutes in United States v. Bishop, 412
U.S. 346, 93 S. Ct. 2008 (1973).
The notion that "willfully" requires a "bad purpose" derives from
the opinion in United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 S. Ct. 223
(1933). Based on Murdock, the Fifth Circuit held in Wardlaw v. United
States, 203 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953), that "willfully" included an evil
motive or bad purpose. Nevertheless, in McBride v. United States,
225 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956), the
Fifth Circuit distinguished Murdock and Wardlaw as being cases of
alleged tax violations and held that "willful" had a different meaning
in a prosecution for making false records under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
McBride approved an instruction specifically stating that proof of an
evil intent was not required and that "willful means no more than
that the forbidden act is done deliberately and with knowledge." 225
F.2d at 253. This definition has subsequently been approved on several
occasions in § 1001 prosecutions. United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d
187, 194 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S. Ct. 739
(1977).
1989,
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In United States v. Kerley, 643 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), the
court held that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the failure to
charge the jury that "willfully" means acting with bad purpose or evil
motive was reversible error. The court again distinguished Pomponio
as being limited to tax violations but concluded that the "bad purpose
or evil motive" element was required because of Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
In United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1986), a prose-
cution for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the court approved a
definition that "willfully" meant an act "committed voluntarily and
purposely, with the specific intent to disobey or disregard the law."
794 F.2d at 1100. Hunt specifically rejected a contention that revers-
ible error is avoided "only if the judge utters the magic words 'with
bad purpose."' Id.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have recommended that "willfully"
not be defined unless the word appears in the statute allegedly violated
by the defendant. Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh
Circuit § 6.03 (West 1980); Manual of Model Jury Instructions for the
Ninth Circuit § 5.07 (West 1985). See DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.06 (West 1988 Cum. Supp.).
The Committee declines to go so far, because there are cases where
the courts have engrafted an element of "willfulness" even when that
term does not appear in the statute. For example, in United States v.
Kent, 608 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980),
the court indicated that although the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1341, does not mention intent, an "implicit element of mail fraud is
a specific intent to commit fraud." 608 F.2d at 545, n.3. In United
States v. Salinas-Garza, 803 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1986), the court con-
sidered the currency reporting statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). Al-
though the statute only uses the term "knowingly," the court held
that the statute also requires the act be done "willfully," that is, the
defendant must be shown to have intentionally violated a known legal
duty. 803 F.2d at 838. Although the general conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. §§ 371-373 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), contains no express intent
requirement, the Fifth Circuit held that a conviction under that stat-
ute requires proof of "at least the degree of criminal intent necessary
for the substantive offense itself." Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S.
672, 678 (1959), quoted in United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153,
1172 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 766 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985).
The Supreme Court has cautioned that the required mental state
may even be different for different elements of the same crime, and
that the mental element encompasses more than just the two possi-
bilities of "specific" and "general" intent. Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985). The Committee has therefore abandoned
the indiscriminate use of the term "willfully" accompanied by an in-
flexible definition of that term. Instead, we have followed the lead of
the Federal Judicial Center and have attempted to clearly define what
state of mind is required, i.e., what the defendant must know and
intend to be guilty of the particular crime charged. See Federal Ju-
dicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions (1988).
We stress, however, that the judge will generally wish to make clear
the meaning of offense definitions in the context of the case at hand
by giving a "theory of the case" instruction based upon the parties'
submissions.
See generally G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §6 6.5-6.5.5 (1978);
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4-3.11 (2nd ed. 1986); Cohen, Actus
Reus, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 15 (S. Kadish ed. 1983); Edgar,
supra note 5, at 1028; Tigar, Crime Talk, Rights Talk, and Double-Talk: Thoughts
on Reading Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 101 (1986).
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as those involving public health and safety; generally, these are petty
offenses or at most misdemeanors. 12 The path to understanding is also
strewn with a variety of other concepts designed to deal with such prob-
lems as the unintended result, or the proper treatment of the defendant
who knew a given result was likely but did not affirmatively "desire" it,
or the defendant who desired a particular harmful result but whose acts
created only a negligible risk that it would occur.
These academic distinctions have, in my view, contributed far more
confusion than clarity to the task of judges and lawyers who are trying
to figure out what to tell juries about the elements of offenses. 13 To take
a common example of confusion, consider the cases in which the defendant
claims that the government must prove not only that he intended a spe-
cific unlawful result, but that he also knew the result was unlawful:
intentional violation of a known legal duty.
The prosecutor would probably respond that "ignorance of the law is
no excuse," and would cite Lambert v. California.'4 A judge would agree
with the prosecutor in many cases. For example, with respect to unlawful
transportation of aliens, the Fifth Circuit has held that the government
need not prove that the defendant knew or believed that the aliens were
unlawfully in the United States. 15 The Ninth Circuit has followed the
Fifth Circuit, but there is some contrary authority.'
6
As to many other federal offenses, however, the defense position would
be upheld. For example, in the prosecution of a taxpayer under 26 U.S.C.
12 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that serious constitutional ques-
tions would be raised by classifying strict liability offenses as felonies. In Mor-
issette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), Justice Jackson states:
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement
of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to
strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from
innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore
allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the
individual should not be extended to common-law crimes on judicial
initiative.
Id. at 263.
13 George Fletcher reminds us that European systems focus more upon the risk
created by the actor's conduct than upon her desire that an unlawful result obtain.
G. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at §§ 6.5.1, 6.5.2. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
(Proposed Official Draft 1962), cited with approval in Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 424 n.5 (1985).
1,4 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
"5 United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). Judge Rubin's dissent on this issue in Merkt I
is well reasoned.
16 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-
6214 (Dec. 1, 1989). The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit in
another significant and related alien case, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987) (aliens' unknowing waiver of their rights to suspend deportation and appeal
rendered subsequent deportation proceedings unreliable and felony indictments
for returning to U.S. were dismissed); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,
481 U.S. 828 (1987) (alien must be permitted to challenge legality of prior de-
portation order); Bland v. United States, 299 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1962), discussed
infra at notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
1989]
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§ 7201 for income tax evasion, or under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) for making
a false statement on a return, "willfulness" means the intentional vio-
lation of a known legal duty. 17 Therefore, a taxpayer on trial for evasion
is entitled to present evidence that she intended to comply with the law
as she understood it. If such evidence raises a reasonable doubt, the jury
should acquit. 8
However, a taxpayer will not be heard to say that he believed the entire
system of imposing taxes to be unconstitutional, and that he therefore
lacked specific intent. 9 For the sake of completeness, one must also note
the Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion in United States v. Garber,2° which
holds that if a taxpaying requirement is sufficiently confusing that a
reasonable onlooker would be unable to decipher it, the taxpayer may
present evidence of that confusion as bearing upon the issue of intent.
Moreover, it is one of the curiosities of criminal jurisprudence that
courts and lawyers continue to say that ignorance of the law will not
excuse, and to cite Lambert for that proposition when the result in that
case points in just the opposite direction. Lambert struck down a felony
registration statute because it did not require proof that the defendant
knew she was required to register, and there was no evidence making it
probable that she knew of her obligation.
Nor, of course, does Lambert stand alone. For example, the Fifth Circuit
has held that a defendant may not be convicted of failing to report im-
portation of currency in an amount greater than $5,000 without proof
that she knew of the reporting obligation and intended not to comply
with it.21
These observations, coupled with the discussion below, should make
one hesitate before telling a jury that "ignorance of the law is not an
17 United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976); Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492 (1943). See also United States v. Cox, 348 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1954).
18 United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984). On the same basis,
an "advice of counsel" defense may be sustained. See also United States v. Cox,
348 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435 (7th Cir.
1954).
19 See United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 907 (1985).
20 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979). Garber sold her blood, which was of a rare type,
to a blood bank and did not report the money she received. She was convicted of
evading income tax. The Fifth Circuit held that the question of whether a sale
of blood constitutes a taxable event (as opposed to an exchange of equivalents)
was sufficiently recondite that Garber should have been permitted to adduce
expert testimony on the confusion among tax experts. This testimony could not
possibly have related to her state of mind, because the expert she wanted to call
had no knowledge of her actual mental state. Rather, the court reasoned that
when taxability is problematic as a matter of law, legal ambiguity is relevant to
show that the defendant herself may not have been aware of an obligation to
report. The opinion is justifiable in part because the criminal sanction for tax
evasion rests at the apex of a pyramid of civil, administrative, and penal provisions
and ought therefore to be narrowly drawn.
21 United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978). However, it may
be appropriate to give an "ostrich" instruction when knowledge is an element of
the offense. United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 37:4
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excuse." Indeed, although the Devitt & Blackmar treatise includes a
standard instruction to this effect, 22 the 1988 supplement lists at least as
many cases holding the instruction (or one like it) to have been improper
as those upholding it.2 3 A jury instruction that has only a 50-50 chance
of being right is not a particularly good bet.
Of course, the prosecution must prove specific intent to violate a known
legal duty as an element of every conspiracy case, even if the underlying
offense-object is a so-called "general intent" crime.24 Conspiracy and at-
tempt are, as the Supreme Court has said, paradigmatic specific intent
offenses.
25
It might even be that specific intent would mean different things with
respect to the same offense in different settings. For example, a mail
fraud scheme based upon false statements would require the government
to prove that the accused acted with the intent to defraud or cheat, and
with knowledge of the falsity of his statements or reckless disregard of
whether he spoke the truth.26
Suppose, however, that the scheme were the type at issue in Carpenter
v. United States,27 where the defendant Winans violated his fiduciary duty
to maintain the secrecy of proprietary information belonging to his em-
ployer. Winans, it will be recalled, was a reporter for the Wall Street
Journal. He used his column in the Journal to promote stocks in which
he had invested or about which he had tipped his cohorts. In such a case,
the scheme to defraud does not necessarily involve falsehood: The gov-
ernment must prove that the accused sought to obtain money or property
through the willful violation of a legal duty that he knew he owed to his
employer. While the Court's earlier decision in McNally v. United States28
has cut back on the number of mail fraud cases based upon this kind of
violation of duty, Carpenter makes clear that such theories are viable if
the defendant plans to impose financial harm on the victim.
29
22 1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS §
14.10 (3d ed. 1977).
23 See, in addition to cases discussed elsewhere in this essay, United States v.
Winston, 558 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1977). See generally E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR,
supra note 22, at 268-71 (Supp. 1988).
24 See United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1171-73 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985).
25 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Foshee, 569 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1978), modified, 578 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1978),
appeal after remand, 606 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082
(1980).
27 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
28 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
29 It is entirely possible that mail frauds based upon violation of a regulatory
or statutory duty will continue to be prosecutable even in the wake of McNally
and Carpenter. If this is so, then such cases as United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646
F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Crude Co. v. United States, 455
U.S. 908 (1982), are still good law. In Uni Oil, the scheme to defraud consisted
in part of a plan to violate the oil price control statutes and regulations. To survive
McNally, the indictment in such a case would have to allege more than a simple
plan to defraud the agency of its right to have.its regulations obeyed. Rather, the
end object would have to involve taking money or property. Cf. Tigar, Mail Fraud,
Morals and U.S. Attorneys, 11 LITIGATION 22 (Fall 1984).
19891
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As a final illustration of the confusion that would attend an attempt
to craft a unitary definition of willfulness, consider Keegan v. United
States.30 In Keegan, the defendants were activists in the German-Amer-
ican Fund and were charged under the Selective Service Laws with con-
spiracy to counsel draft evasion. Their convictions were reversed by the
Supreme Court. The plurality faulted the trial judge's instructions as
having withdrawn from the jury critical issues concerning the defendants'
intent. The district court told the jury that innocent motives and a desire
to test the law were not defenses.31
Following what it believed to be Keegan's teaching, the Tenth Circuit
reversed convictions of Japanese-Americans charged under the same stat-
ute in Okamoto v. United States. 2 In Okamoto, the district judge refused
a defense request to instruct the jury that the defendants' belief-that
the obligation of Japanese-Americans in relocation camps to compelled
military service was open to serious question-could be considered as
bearing upon their intent to disobey a known legal duty. The court of
appeals held this refusal was error.
Keegan and Okamoto could be read to suggest that every defendant
who believes a legal duty to be unconstitutional may not have the specific
intent to violate that legal duty. A more sensible reading would simply
harmonize these cases with the cases holding that the defendant must
act with knowledge of his duty, and that his genuine uncertainty about
that duty may negate a finding of knowledge.
The Model Penal Code has attempted to clarify the confusion by iden-
tifying four types of mental elements: intention, knowledge, recklessness
and negligence. 33 The Model Penal Code also provides a means to deter-
mine which mental state attaches to which nonmental element of a
crime 4
The Code has been the basis for penal law changes in most of the states,
but has not had much influence on federal law. Congress has not been
consistent in salting the criminal code with mens rea requirements, nor
has it established any test for determining what a given element means
in a particular statute. For the sake of present-day clarity, therefore, one
must backtrack a bit to the cases on which current federal intent law has
been built.
The result in Carpenter could be sustained on the basis that Winans was "steal-ing" his employer's confidential information, rather than simply violating a fi-duciary duty. Such an analysis is subject to criticism, see Tigar, The Right of
Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1443 (1984). Morissette principles,discussed below, require a finding of specific intent in the sense of knowledge and
desire.
30 325 U.S. 478 (1945).
31325 U.S. at 493-94.
32 152 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1945).
- MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985), discussed in W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'Ir,
supra note 11, at § 3.4(c).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1985), discussed in W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
supra note 11, at § 3.4(c).
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II. Morissette: JUSTICE JACKSON'S BASIC TEXT ON INTENT IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
Morissette went deer hunting on a disused government bombing range.
He didn't get a deer, but thought to pay for the trip by loading spent bomb
casings on his truck, crushing them and selling them as scrap. He realized
a profit of $84.00. He was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 641 of converting
government property.35 The trial judge instructed the jury that if Mor-
issette knew he was on government land and intended to take the shell
casings, he was guilty.
In an opinion by Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court reversed. Jackson
began with a disclaimer:
Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has
undertaken to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehen-
sive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a
mental element and those that do not. We attempt no closed
definition, for the law on the subject is neither settled nor
static.
36
The Court then held: First, the absence of an intent requirement in a
felony statute is not dispositive. Second, when a federal crime is derived
from the common law, one will presume that Congress intended to adopt
the common law intent requirement as well. This rule of construction
will be applied even to an offense such as "conversion," which has no
precise common law antecedent but reflects an evident congressional in-
tention to fill in gaps in the common law of theft. Third, even with respect
to "an offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts have
no guidance except the Act,"'3 7 the Court will not lightly presume that
Congress intended to omit an intent requirement, for to do so would
"change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. '3
Of course, none of this tells us precisely how to define the intent re-
quirement in any given case. The Court simply acknowledges that Con-
gress "has at times required a specific intent or purpose which will require
some specialized knowledge or design for some evil beyond the common
law intent to do injury." 9 In Morissette's case, the jury was to be told
that the government must prove that the defendant took the property
intending to "wrongfully" deprive the government of it.4o If the jury
formed a reasonable doubt based on Morissette's contention that he
thought the casings were abandoned, it should acquit.
35 "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or
the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record,
voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof. .. ." shall be guilty of an offense. Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 248 (1952) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982)).
31 342 U.S. at 260.
11 Id. at 262.
8 1d. at 263.
Id. at 264-65, 265 n.25 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 242; Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945)).
41 Id. U.S. at 275-76.
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That is, Morissette had to know that he was taking the property of
someone else, for his own benefit or the benefit of someone else other than
the true owner. The government would not have to prove that Morissette
knew that taking somebody else's property was wrong, nor would it be a
defense for him to say that he did not think stealing was a crime.
Morissette is regarded as a basic text on the federal law of criminal
intent, particularly in its insistence that the jury's function not be in-
vaded, and its recognition that some intent requirement presumptively
attaches to all federal crimes.
III. A COHERENT APPROACH TO DEFINING "WILLFULLY"
Every criminal statute requires the government to prove that the de-
fendant committed a criminal act or acts. Even a conspiracy charge re-
quires the act of agreement, and, in the traditional 18 U.S.C. § 371 case,
also requires (by someone acting intentionally during and in furtherance
of the conspiracy) an overt act. Each of these acts is an "element" of the
offense. 41 The Model Penal Code calls these "material elements," to dis-
tinguish them from such things as jurisdiction and venue,42 and states
in effect that a mens rea requirement will attach only to such elements.
This definition is not entirely satisfactory for federal crimes, because often
the federal jurisdictional element is of sufficient importance that some
mental state must exist with respect to it. For example, to convict of mail
fraud, it must at least be reasonably contemplated that the mails would
be used in furtherance of the scheme.43 For this reason, one must consider
federal crimes one at a time to determine the mental state intended by
Congress or imposed by judicial decision.
A. Intentional Violation of Known Legal Duty: The Most
Stringent Test
1. Income Tax Cases
As mentioned above, income tax felony cases require "specific intent"
in its most traditional sense. This requirement is reaffirmed in a line of
cases most commonly thought to have begun with Spies v. United States.44
In Spies, the Court was principally concerned with marking off the dis-
tinction between willful attempts to evade tax under the predecessor to
26 U.S.C. § 7201, and the misdemeanor (now § 7203) of willfully failing
to file a return or pay a tax. The Court held that the attempt to evade
41 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
42 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(4), 1.13(10) (1985), cited in W. LAFAvE & A.
ScOvr, supra note 11, at § 3.4(c).
41 United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1033 (1980).
317 U.S. 492 (1943).
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had to include some positive act of evasion, a requirement most often met
today by proof that the accused filed a false return.45 In addition, the
government must prove a tax deficiency. 46
However, the Court also reaffirmed the holding in United States v.
Murdock,47 that
He whose conduct is defined as criminal is one who "willfully"
fails to pay the tax, to make a return, to keep the required
records, or to supply the needed information. Congress did not
intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding
as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return,
or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should
become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the
prescribed standard of conduct. And the requirement that the
omission in these instances, must be willful, to be criminal, is
persuasive that the same element is essential to the offense of
failing to supply information.
48
Indeed, Justice Jackson expressed the Murdock standard in somewhat
different language, and said that in an attempt to evade case, "We would
expect willfulness ... to include some element of evil motive and want
ofjustification in view of all the financial circumstances of the taxpayer."49
Murdock had said that willfulness would include "bad faith or evil in-
tent."50
The Court clarified matters in United States v. Pomponio,51 holding that
the Spies/Murdock glosses were ornamental but not strictly necessary.
An intent charge in a tax case satisfied the statute if the jury was told
that the government must prove the defendant intentionally violated a
known legal duty.5 2 While this is "all" the trial judge must do, dozens of
cases make clear that she may not do less.53
15 It must be borne in mind, however, that the evasion offense can be committed
by engaging in other overt fraudulent conduct, such as maintaining false books
or trying to deceive IRS agents-in which case the statute of limitations would
run from that act and not from the date of filing the return. In a false return
evasion case, the felony offense under section 7201 may be identical with the
misdemeanor offense under section 7207. In such a situation, the defendant
charged under section 7201 will not be entitled to a lesser-included offense in-
struction. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965). Willfulness means the
same thing in misdemeanor as in felony tax cases. To the same effect is Bishop
v. United States, 412 U.S. 346 (1972).
46See Sansone, 380 U.S. at 351 (citing Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339,
361 (1958)).
47 290 U.S. 389 (1933).481 d. at 396.
49317 U.S. at 498.
10 290 U.S. at 398.51 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
52 Id. at 12.
13 See, e.g., cases cited supra at notes 12-14, and infra at notes 78-89 . But see
United States v. Kerley, 643 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), discussed supra
note 10.
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2. Civil Rights Cases
In Screws v. United States,54 a sheriff, a local policeman and a special
deputy beat a black prisoner to death on the courthouse steps. They were
found guilty by a jury under the predecessor provision to 18 U.S.C. § 242.
The defendants claimed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
To this, the plurality opinion replied that a vague criminal statute may
be saved from due process infirmity by requiring the prosecution to prove
that the accused acted with knowledge that his conduct was forbidden.
The plurality therefore held that "willfully" in the statute means a
"specific intent." One searches the opinion in vain for a concise definition
of this term, but the Court is clearly requiring purposeful conduct directed
at violating a known legal duty. It could be argued that the Court merely
requires that the defendant knowingly violate a federal right that has
been clearly and authoritatively declared. However, such a formulation
would either invade the jury's function of determining knowledge or ren-
der the knowledge requirement otiose.
A more sensible reading of Screws gives weight to the plurality's con-
clusion that the specific intent requirement in civil rights cases ensures
that the accused "is aware that what he does is precisely that which the
statute forbids." 55 This reading is reinforced by the plurality's reference
to Spies and Murdock,56 and has been preferred by the courts that have
construed these statutes.5 7 One can only add that the plurality concedes
that "'willful' is a word of many meanings,"58 thus robbing the case of
most generative effect that it might have.5"
3. Intent and the First Amendment
In Spock v. United States,60 the defendants were charged with conspir-
acy to obstruct the selective service military draft during the Vietnam
4 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
5 325 U.S. at 104.
511325 U.S. at 101. The Court contrasted its holding with what is termed the
"general rule": "If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circum-
stances known to him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those
circumstances, he intentionally breaks the law in the only sense in which the
law ever considers intent." 325 U.S. at 96 (quoting Ellis v. United States, 206
U.S. 246, 257 (1907)). Obviously, the Ellis formulation is too broad, but it at least
captures the essence of what is sometimes called "general intent."
57 See Leonard v. City of Frankfort Electric and Water Plant Bd., 752 F.2d 189
(6th Cir. 1985); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525 (11th Cir.
1983); Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983).
51325 U.S. at 101.
a, The Screws method of saving statutes has been applied to a Tennessee law
forbidding the crime against nature. A defendant who engaged in consensual
cunnilingus was held to have had fair warning that such dietary practices are
unlawful because of consistent judicial interpretations to that effect. Rose v. Locke,
423 U.S. 48 (1975).
60 464 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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war era. The court of appeals reversed their convictions, holding that the
trial judge's definition of conspiracy violated the first amendment.
The defendants had made a bifarious agreement, embracing both lawful
and unlawful goals. However, their lawful activity consisted of protected
speech, so that the dividing line between "lawful" and "unlawful" was
the same as that between "protected" and "unprotected." The judge who
draws lines under such circumstances must take special care to avoid
overbroad definitions of criminal conduct.6 1 The narrowing function is
performed, the court held, by insisting that the government prove that
the defendant intended to embrace the unlawful conspiratorial objectives,
and that the proof be made by evidence more reliable than that found
adequate in the ordinary case.
This narrowing function of specific intent may also be found in other
contexts. In Falcone v. United States,62 the Court insisted upon proof that
the indicted sellers intended to join the distillers' conspiracy. The case
insulates "ordinary business behavior" from prosecutorial scrutiny. In
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,63 discussed in depth below,
the Court used a knowledge of potential harm requirement to prevent
criminalization of procompetitive pricing information in an antitrust case.
4. Hand Grenades and Other Obvious Devices
In United States v. Freed,6 the Court held that the 18 U.S.C. § 5861(d)
prohibition on possessing an unregistered firearm did not include a "scien-
ter" requirement. The government was not required to plead or prove
that Freed and his friend knew that the hand grenades they had were
unregistered, much less that Congress had enacted a registration re-
quirement. All the government had to plead and prove was that Freed
and his friend knew that hand grenades are firearms.
While the Court's opinion juggles some cases to support its holding, its
rationale is hard to identify.6 5 In a footnote explaining that the "no specific
intent" holding applies as well to a conspiracy to violate § 5861(d), the
Court offers this explanation:
We need not decide whether a criminal conspiracy to do an act
"innocent in itself' and not known by the alleged conspirators
to be prohibited must be actuated by some corrupt motive other
than the intention to do the act which is prohibited and which
is the object of the conspiracy. An agreement to acquire hand
grenades is hardly an agreement innocent in itself. Therefore
what we have said of the substantive offenses satisfies on these
special facts the requirements for a conspiracy.
66
61 See also Comment, The University and the Public: The Right of Access by
Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 132 (1966) (authored by
David Frohnmayer).
62 544 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977).
0 438 U.S. 422 (1978), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 86-91.
401 U.S. 601 (1971).
6 Justice Brennan does better in his concurrence, and prefigures his opinion
for the Court in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
401 U.S. at 609 n.14.
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The Supreme Court and the lower courts continue to cite Freed, usually
to distinguish it.67 It is difficult to see how the Court's conspiracy rationale
survives such cases as United States v. Bailey,6 which identifies conspir-
acy as emphatically a specific intent crime. The Court appears to have
confused the ease of proving that a possessor of hand grenades was up to
something with the legal definition of the alleged malefactor's state of
mind. A similar confusion existed for a time with respect to misapplication
of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. § 656: The jury was, under some older
cases, authorized to convict if it found that the defendant recklessly dis-
regarded the bank's interest.69 The courts of appeals have come to reject
that standard, insisting instead that the government prove that the de-
fendant intended to injure or defraud the bank. To be sure, evidence of
indifference or reckless disregard may be admissible as tending to show
the forbidden intent.7 0
The point is that even when the evidence casts powerful doubt on the
innocence of the defendant's motives, the definition of the mental element
remains unchanged. The bank misapplication statute presents at least
as strong a case as Freed for a lesser standard of intent. After all, the
statute is directed only at the "officer, director, agent or employee" of
federal or federally-insured banks, or others in a position to know their
responsibilities towards the bank's funds. It would not seem unfair to
impose on such persons a special duty to know the rules and follow them. 71
Weighing against such arguments, however, is the consistent concern
of federal courts that those subjected to the many and complex duties
imposed by federal regulation should not be criminally liable for a vio-
lation except when they meant to do wrong. The vulnerability of Freed
to such an argument is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Herbert72 and the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Anderson.7' Both cases involved possession of weapons bearing no out-
ward evidence that they were of the automatic firing type defined as
"firearms" by the statute.
67 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); United States v. Anderson,
853 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 860 F.2d 166 (1988), conviction re-
versed, 885 F.2d 1248 (1989) (en banc); United States v. Drasen, 845 F.2d 731(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988); United States v. Hayes Inter-
national, 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986); Comment, Criminal Sanctions for En-
vironmental Crimes and the Knowledge Requirement: United States v. Hayes
International, 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 535 (1987).
444 U.S. 394 (1980).
69 See United States V. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 833 (1983) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982)).
70 See id.; United States v. Cauble 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1005.
" A similar argument could be made in the Liparota situation if the food stamp
statute were limited to those involved on a day-to-day basis in handling food
stamps as an incident of their employment. See infra text accompanying notes
79-84.
72 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983) (construing
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and (e) (1982)).
71 853 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc pending.
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Herbert distinguished Freed and required proof that the defendant
knew the guns met the statutory definition of an unregistered firearm. 74
The panel in Anderson refused to follow Herbert, feeling itself bound by
prior Fifth Circuit authority.7 6 However, the panel urged en banc recon-
sideration of the issue, noting that applying Freed to weapons that appear
"innocent" may fall afoul of Lambert v. California7 6 and Liparota v. United
States.77
The Freed majority's failure to have and express a reasoned basis for
its decision, and the Court's more recent treatment of the mental element
of federal offenses, undermines Freed's vitality on all sets of facts outside
its narrow reach. Issue-by-issue parsing of categories of cases yields fair
but not unerring predictability. Can we, however, sketch a more com-
prehensive view of federal law on this subject?
B. How to Define the Intent Element of Federal Crimes
The Murdock-Spies-Screws-Morissette formulation couples intention or
purpose to do an act with knowledge of facts that should tell him the act
is in some sense wrongful. It is not, however, possible to classify all cases
involving such an intent and such knowledge under a single standard.
Nor, as the discussion above suggests, will the presence or absence of the
word "willfully" in the statute be a talismanic guide. In my view, the
only valid means of defining the intent requirement for any given federal
crime combines the "element-by-element" approach, devised by the Model
Penal Code and used by the Supreme Court in Liparota v. United States,78
with the definitional approach taken by the Court in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co.
7 9
1. The Liparota Approach: Parsing the Statute
In Liparota v. United States,80 the defendant restaurant owner bought
food stamps from an undercover Department of Agriculture inspector for
less than the stamps' face value. The defendant's restaurant was not
authorized to accept food stamps. A federal statute provides "whoever
knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or au-
thorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the
regulations" is guilty of a felony if the value involved is $100 or more.8'
Liparota's counsel requested the trial judge to instruct that the gov-
14 Herbert, 698 F.2d at 986-87.
11 United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
836 (1973).
76 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
17 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
"I Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), discussed in United States
v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
79 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
80 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
81 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)(1982).
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ernment must prove that "the defendant knowingly did an act which the
law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law. 8 2 The trial judge
refused this request, and instead instructed that "'knowingly'... means
that the Defendant realized what he was doing, and was aware of the
nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or
accident."83
The question was one of statutory interpretation and the Court reverted
to the Morissette presumption that some intent is required. The govern-
ment's view, that no mens rea was required, would have criminalized the
conduct of a food stamp "recipient who ... used stamps to purchase food
from a store that, unknown to him, charged higher than normal prices
to food stamp program participants. 8 4
The Court held that the defendant must be proven to have acted in-
tentionally and with knowledge that the acquisition, possession or trans-
fer of the stamp was not authorized. In reaching this result, the majority
counselled that each element of the crime should be separately analyzed
to determine what if any mental element should exist with respect to it.
This approach, when coupled with the presumption that there be some
intent requirement greater than proof the defendant did not act acciden-
tally, is a powerful analytical tool in determining when a statute requires
the government to prove that the defendant intentionally violated a
known legal duty.
On the way to its result, the Court disposed of two arguments that are
often raised but are most often inapt. First, the Court rejected that anal-
ogy to non-mens rea "public welfare" offenses, resting on the Morissette
treatment of that subject. 85 The Court also reminded us that the principle
of lenity in construction of criminal statutes counsels inferring an intent
requirement. 86 Second, the Court rejected the contention that its for-
mulation creates a "mistake of law" defense, which is often also encap-
sulated in the misleading statement that "ignorance of the law is no
excuse." The federal criminal law is planted thick with offenses that
require proof that the accused knew his conduct was unlawful in some
sense. The Court's reasoning on this point is worth noting:
Our holding today no more creates a "mistake of law" defense
than does a statute making knowing receipt of stolen goods
unlawful .... In both cases, there is a legal element in the
definition of the offense. In the case of a receipt-of-stolen-goods
82 471 U.S. at 422.
' Id. Three courts of appeals had reached a contrary result. Id. at 423 n.4(citing United States v. Pollard, 724 F.2d 1438 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983); United
States v. Faltico, 687 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088 (1983);
United States v. O'Brien, 686 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1982)).
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426.
Id. at 425.
86Id. at 427 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955);
United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)).
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statute, the legal element is that the goods were stolen; in this
case, the legal element is that the "use, transfer, acquisition,"
etc., were in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations.
It is not a defense to a charge of receipt of stolen goods that
one did not know that such receipt was illegal, and it is not a
defense [in this case].., that one did not know that possessing
food stamps in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations
was illegal. It is, however, a defense to a charge of knowing
receipt of stolen goods that one did not know that the goods
were stolen, just as it is a defense to [this] charge ... that one
did not know that one's possession was unauthorized.17
This is the same distinction drawn above between the tax evasion de-
fendant who says he did not know of a particular reporting requirement
and one who claims that he believed that one did not have to pay the
taxes exacted even under a proper reading of Title 26.
Once one has parsed the statute into its constituent elements, one must
assign the appropriate mental state to each element.
2. The Gypsum Approach
United States v. United States Gypsum"8 was a Sherman Act section 1
criminal case. The defendant corporations and individuals were charged
with forming a "combination" and with conspiracy to restrain competition
in the wallboard industry, principally by the exchange of price infor-
mation.
The trial judge managed to embody several misconceptions in a single
paragraph when he told the jury:
The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and
natural consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the
exchanges of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain,
and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as
a matter of law, to have intended that result. 89
The judge courted reversal in this criminal case by freighting the charge
with a burden-shifting presumption, then underscoring his solecism with
"as a matter of law." To put such words in an intent instruction violated
the precepts of Morissette. Chief Justice Burger, in rejecting the govern-
ment's defense of the instruction, trod familiar pathways in the law of
mens rea.
The hard question was what standard of intent or knowledge is required
in a criminal antitrust case. Would the prosecutor be required to prove
that a defendant desired anticompetitive effects, or rather, that he acted
volitionally in the knowledge that his conduct would probably have such
8 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.9 (citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1971); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
89Id. at 430.
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effects? The answer turns on the "act" element that is at issue. If, as in
Gypsum, the defendants are charged with producing anticompetitive ef-
fects, it may be enough to prove that they acted with knowledge that
these effects were probable. If, however, the charge is construed as more
akin to a traditional conspiracy, and rests upon an unlawful agreement,
then the defendant will be guilty only if he had the "purpose of producing
anticompetitive effects ... even if such effects did not come to pass."90
The choice between "purpose" and "knowledge" will be familiar to stu-
dents of the Model Penal CodeY1 The Gypsum Court's decision to choose
the lower of these two standards for the particular case before it is de-
fensible on a number of levels. First, the offense as charged in the in-
dictment required proof that a harm occurred: the defendants were
charged not only with agreement, but with a "concert of action" to fix
prices and other terms of sale .92 Moreover, the harm is one that the typical
antitrust defendant is very likely to recognize as embodying impermis-
sible conduct. Also, as the Court noted, the typical antitrust case involves
entrepreneurial calculations of opportunity and risk by a business person
already engaged in a deliberate course of profit-maximization.9 3 Under
such circumstances, the risks of overcriminalization are acceptably low.
A similar analysis has been used to uphold a kind of "displaced intent"
analysis in a number of federal cases. For example, if the defendant
assaults a federal officer, he need not be shown to have known of his
victim's status.94 The conduct is clearly harmful, and the defendant's
intent with respect to the physical harm element makes him a worthy
candidate for the criminal sanction without regard to any knowledge of
the victim's status.
In United States v. Yermian,95 a 5-4 majority held that in a prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. section 1001 for making a false statement, the govern-
ment need not prove that the accused knew that the statement was "in
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States." There is a textual argument for this result, since the
statutory words "knowingly and willfully" follow the reference to agency
jurisdiction.
Moreover, the "act" elements require that the statement be false and
material, and in that sense that it cause harm. 96 In addition, the defendant
90 Id. at 444 n. 21.
91 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
92 438 U.S. at 427-28.
91 Id. at 445-46.
14See United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom. Hernandez v. United States, 474 U.S. 905 (1985).
95 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
Query, however, whether the defendant is sufficiently on notice of the harm-
ful nature of his conduct when the statement is not made directly to a federal
official, but to a third person who may in turn convey it to such an official. This
prospect would exist, for example, in a federal program requiring sellers of crude
oil to certify to their purchasers the provenance of the oil. That certification could,
if false, be the subject of the section 1001 prosecution. See generally United States
v. Uni Oil Co., Inc., 646 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Crude Co.
v. United States, 455 U.S. 908 (1982).
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must know the statement to be false and must have intended to deceive.97
One might argue that the federal agency element is trivial, in the sense
that it is simply a means of conferring federal jurisdiction upon lying
that would otherwise be punishable under state law. Such an analysis,
while questionable, would support not attaching any mental state to that
element.
Too, the Yermian Court expressly reserved the question whether some
intent must exist with respect to agency jurisdiction. 9 It would be con-
sistent with Yermian, therefore, to hold (by analogy to mail fraud cases)99
that the defendant must reasonably have contemplated that the state-
ment would be used by a federal agency. Such a requirement might seem
unnecessary in the typical section 1001 case, which involves submission
of a written falsehood directly to a federal agency or federally regulated
entity. Prosecutable oral statements are typically made to a federal agent
who identifies himself as such. The contours of section 1001 are limited
in some circuits by cases holding that statements in an oral interview, 100
and written ones constituting exculpatory denials, 0 1 are not within the
statute.
There remains the case, illustrated by United States v. Uni Oil, Inc.,102
in which the defendant provides a certification or statement to a non-
governmental entity under circumstances raising a genuine doubt
whether he knew it would be submitted to or relied upon by a govern-
mental entity. In Uni Oil, the defendants certified the provenance or
official classification of crude oil they sold to private purchasers. An im-
proper certification was itself punishable, but could it also be a violation
of section 1001? If one concludes that the application of section 1001 is
not made inappropriate by the availability of more specific statutes,
1 0 3
then liability would turn on whether the statement bore a close enough
relation to agency functions. As to that element, and on those facts, some
intent requirement would be appropriate, and such a result is consistent
with Yermian.
The analysis of intent will, however, be very different when the "act"
element of the offense does not involve infliction of some demonstrable
harm. As I have noted in an earlier essay, 0 4 a specific intent requirement
'7 United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975, 976 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
468 U.S. at 75 n.14.
United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1987).
100 United States v. Poutre, 646 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Cole,
622 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v.
Clifford, 426 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Erlichman, 379 F.
Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1974).
101 United States v. McCright, 821 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1005 (1988); United States v. Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 899-901 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. Eisenberg v. United States, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
102 United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 954-55 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. Crude Co. v. United States, 455 U.S. 908 (1982).
103 See United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1978) (catch-all §
1001 is not to be used to pyramid penalties with other more specific statutes).
"o, Tigar, supra note 11, at 131-34.
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that includes both knowledge and purpose often fulfills the function of
making otherwise vague statutes certain, of expressing a legislative in-
tention to reserve for the felony sanction only a small slice of ostensibly
similar conduct, or of protecting against over-criminalization of arguably
protected behavior.
Something more basic is going on here, however: punishing intentions
unaccompanied by harmful result is usually, and ought more generally
to be, a task approached with diffidence. If, as is commonly asserted, 105
punishing inchoate crime is legitimate because we have something to
fear from those who desire unlawful results, it is not unreasonable to
formulate an intent standard that clearly-and narrowly-reflects that
preference.
As the standard jury charge has it, knowledge and purpose can seldom
be proved directly. 10 6 The prosecutor is compelled to build up inferences
from conduct that, because the standard is so precise, strongly corrobor-
ates the forbidden intent. By this measure, an intent requirement is a
price the government should expect to pay for criminalizing conduct that
falls far short of wreaking palpable harm.
The patchwork of federal intent law, when viewed with perspective,
may seem to have a pattern. It becomes easier to reject a simplistic
formulaic approach when one surveys a number of judicial constructions
of federal criminal statutes.
For example, in United States v. Winston,'10 a case arising under the
Railway Labor Act, the court insisted that the government prove the
defendant-employers knew they were violating a legal duty because the
conduct consisted of anti-union speech. That intent requirement served
the statutory purpose and helped ensure that arguably protected activity
was shielded from criminal liability. The trial court had, as the court of
appeals held, wrongly given a variant of the "ignorance of the law" in-
struction.
In Bland v. United States,"'" the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction for
bringing in Cuban emigres without presenting them for inspection. The
district court had failed, in its supplemental instruction, to stress that
"violation without knowledge or intent would not constitute the offense
charged." 0 9
To the same effect is United States v. Fierros,"° in which the court held
that "ignorance of the law" will often be a defense when "an independently
determined legal status or condition ... is one of the operative facts of
the crime.""' In Fierros, the defendant acknowledged that he knew the
05Id. at 138-50.
106 1 E. DEviPT & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 22, at § 14.13.
107 558 F.2d 105 (2nd Cir. 1977).
108 299 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1962).
109 299 F.2d at 108.
1l0 692 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983).
"1 692 F.2d at 1294. "The second category of cases in which a defense of ig-
norance of the law has been read into criminal statutes involves prosecution under
complex regulatory schemes that have the potential of snaring unwitting viola-
tors." 692 F.2d at 1295. Cf. United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985)
(Rubin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), discussed supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
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aliens he was transporting were in the United States illegally, so his
conviction was upheld.
In United States v. Golitschek,112 the defendant was charged with vio-
lating the Arms Export Control Act. The trial court gave a standard
variation of the "ignorance of the law" instruction as found in Devitt &
Blackmar,1 13 while at the same time telling the jury that knowledge of
the unlawfulness of exporting the arms at issue was an element of the
offense. The Second Circuit, which had previously and uncritically re-
peated the "ignorance of the law" dictum," 4 explained Liparota and its
own decisions as follows:
When we say that ignorance of the law is no excuse, or, as was
said in this case, that everyone is presumed to know the law,
we mean only the law that makes the offense punishable, not
the law that in some circumstances sets out legal requirements
that must be known in order to have committed the offense....
[Wihen the law makes knowledge of some requirement an ele-
ment of the offense, it is totally incorrect to say that ignorance
of such law is no excuse or that everyone is presumed to know
such law. Establishing an element of an offense concerning a
requisite state of mind by a presumption relieves the prose-
cution of its burden of proof, contrary to the requirements of
due process.115
The Fifth Circuit, in a case arising under 18 U.S.C. section 1001, has
said that if the defendant was "ignorant of the law or was ill-informed,
and if the trier of fact believed this, he could not be convicted."'1 6
These cases, involving very different statutory provisions, have a com-
mon theme. In each of them we are unsure whether to identify the de-
fendant's conduct as harmful. Our uncertainty may take either of two
forms.
First, some "acts" so clearly violate protected areas that we all recognize
them as invasive: theft, wounding, and invasion of domicile are of this
sort. Other acts may be demonstrably harmful, but their definition is less
the subject of shared values and more clearly the province of legislative
rules. In such cases, we have a lingering uncertainty about the seriousness
of the harm and we deploy an intent requirement as the means of iden-
tifying those actors worthy of punishment. In the second category of cases,
the actor has taken only ambiguous steps towards the consummation of
her or his purpose. The intent requirement is thought to justify punishing
the inchoate behavior.1 1
7
112 808 F.2d 195 (2nd Cir. 1986).
113 808 F.2d at 201. The instruction was evidently based upon 1 E. DEVirT &
C. BLACKMAR, supra note 22, § 14.10.
" United States v. Gregg, 612 F.2d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. South-
land Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
'15 808 F.2d at 202-03 (relying on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524
(1979)).
116 United States v. Whittington, 783 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
H7 For my critical view of this approach to intent, see Tigar, supra note 11, at
127-50.
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IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
George Fletcher, typically discerning, has wondered whether a defend-
ant's desire that someone die could ever be so strong that we would
dispense with proof that he did anything that created a palpable risk of
death."" As I have written elsewhere, the intent requirement of inchoate
offenses is sometimes deliberately set high, so that we can tell that the
defendant really means to cause a harm. Or, the legislature insists that
intent be joined with the forbidden desires of others, as in the case of
conspiracy." 9
As Fletcher also points out, punishing the desire that forbidden con-
sequences ensue is almost entirely an Anglo-American phenomenon. Most
other legal systems like to see more concrete and provable risk of harm
before they unleash the criminal sanction. 120 I have suggested -and still
believe-that our Anglo-American preoccupation with the defendant's
willingness is rooted in the Star Chamber's preoccupation with the in-
choate crimes. '
However that may be, there are many reasons to prefer offense defi-
nitions that punish risk-creators to the exclusion of wishful thinkers, and
the cases discussed above reflect that preference. One way to validate the
preference is to consider that legal duties deemed serious enough to war-
rant criminal sanction define harms that the legislature wants to prevent.
We impose duties on people in order to shape the way in which people
behave toward each other and toward the state. To say that an individual
must act "knowingly" with respect to his legal duty is simply to say
concretely that she must understand that her conduct is harmful.
Of course, that insistence that knowledge be proven occurs against a
background assumption that all persons are sufficiently socialized to un-
derstand that duties imposed by law, if understood as such, must be
obeyed. This background assumption is the basis for cases holding that
a claim of unconstitutionality may not vitiate otherwise proven "knowl-
edge" of the challenged legal duty.
Moreover, some conduct so clearly violates shared notions that the
knowledge requirement is foreshortened. Morissette had merely to know
the shell casings he took were the property of another, and not the further
"fact" that he had a legal duty not to take such property. The robber must
know what she is doing, for we make the background assumption that
socialized beings know the wrongfulness of such conduct if they know
what they are doing. To some extent, these assumptions are artificial,'122
118 G. FLETCHER, supra note 11, at § 6.5 ("Can the lust for death compensate
for a low risk of harm?").
"' Tigar, supra note 11, at 127-50.
120 G. FLETCHER, supra note 11, at § 6.5.
12I Tigar, supra note 11, at 144-47.
122 1 have discussed this point in Tigar, supra note 11, at 147-50. See also Quiros
Pirez, El Pensamiento Juridicio - Penal Burgues: Exposicion y Critica, 8 REVISTA
JURIDICA 5 (1985), cited in Tigar, supra note 11, at 103 n.20..
[Vol. 37:4
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss4/3
"WILLFULNESS" AND "IGNORANCE"
and may not in every case accurately embody what we know about human
consciousness. But that problem, when it arises, may be confronted by
defining the burden of proof with respect to the mental element, and the
range of defenses based on mental condition.
123
We may rightly despair of making the criminal law a sensible, coherent
whole. We ought, however, to understand some of its inherent limitations.
When we say that the defendant need not have known she was violating
a legal duty, or when we limit her right to argue that she did not, we
thereby assimilate the offense we are discussing to the "general intent"
crimes. We are either assuming that everybody knows their duties and
we can dispense with proof in particular cases, or we are saying we do
not care.
The latter position is justifiable only on a "round up the usual suspects"
view of criminal law, that places greatest emphasis on a social control
model. Whatever may be said by adherents of this view, it is at odds with
the teaching of Morissette, which limits its valid reach to social regulation
minor offenses.
The former position elevates the judges' notions of what are shared
assumptions to a standard for all, and fails to recognize that legal rules
are structural creations that define as well as embody perceived necessity.
Dispensing with a specific intent requirement assumes, without the slight
rational basis, that all citizens have internalized the rules so as to elim-
inate the need to prove that they knew them on a particular occasion.
Alternatively, the willingness to dispense with specific intent bespeaks
impatience with defendants who seem to be thumbing their noses at the
judges' views of their duties. This was clearly true of the taxpayer who
claimed that he thought wages were not income, and wanted to say that
to the jury. Judge Higginbotham rightly said that if the argument was
silly, the jury would not believe it.124
But there is another side to this. Maybe there will be a case in which
the argument is not silly, but rather raises a question about the relative
legitimacy of the defendant's and the prosecutor's views of the world. For
example, in Winston,125 the insistence that the government prove the
defendant-employers knew they were violating the law, as opposed to just
engaging in protected antiunion speech, alerts the jury to its role as
monitor of the criminal process. If, in an alien-transporting case, the
government is required to prove that the defendants knew the aliens were
unlawfully in the United States, as against a contention that they were
refugees entitled to remain, the jury must be given fuller rein to make
the important value choices on the way to conviction or acquittal.
Empowerment of the jury by insisting on an intent requirement, as
against invading its function by judicial instruction, is-one will recall-
the linchpin of Justice Jackson's opinion in Morissette. This tension is
also central to our debate about the jury system in American criminal
law. 12 6
123 See Tigar, supra note 11, at 147-50. See also Huckabee, Avoiding the Insanity
Defense Strait-Jacket: the Mens Rea Route, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1987) (ex-
cellent treatment of legislative history of 1984 changes in law).
124 United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984), discussed in text at
note 12, supra.
" Discussed in text at note 106, supra.
126 See generally Tigar, supra note 11, at 113-27.
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